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Abstract: This paper proposes a short apprehension of the reflections of one 
of the most important progressive Islamic scholars, the Egyptian theologian 
Ali Abderraziq. It focuses on his work about Islam and the Fundamentals of 
Power, published in 1925. The main purpose is to allow a more sophisticated 
view of Islamic political thought and to show that there are roots and 
possibilities for an endogen democratic evolution and secularization 
progress coming from within Islamic dogma. 
 
Resumen: Este artículo propone una lectura de las reflexiones de uno de los 
eruditos islámicos progresistas más importantes, el teólogo egipcio Ali 
Abderraziq. Se centra en sus estudios sobre El Islam y los fundamentos del 
poder, publicado en 1925. El objetivo principal del artículo es ofrecer una 
visión más sofisticada del pensamiento político islámico y mostrar que es 
posible un proceso de evolución democrática endógeno y de secularización 
desde dentro del dogma islámico. 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
  
Islam has certainly become a main issue in today’s world politics. 
Religion in general cannot deny political components, tendencies and 
impacts. There has always been an interconnected relationship 
between the two fields of human social action with an interchanging 
predominance of each, driven very far sometimes, even as far as a 
complete absorption of one by the other. Islam, as a matter of fact, has 
become the most politically relevant religion in the last few years. At 
the first sight, it seems to have operated at the same time as a modern 
ideology, able to unite social movements against western domination, 
and as an archaic construction reducing its adherents to a state of 
underdevelopment and barbarie (as under the Taliban regime). It is our 
duty and ethical responsibility as Western scholars to fight against the 
propagandist, caricaturist mode in which Islam is treated for political 
purposes by our Western representatives of power-politics and 
economic and military imperialism. Most analyses of Islam cannot 
avoid a tendency of cultural essentialism, on one hand, or, on the 
other, of a marxist or materialist historical determinism and 
evolutionism. The first denies Islam its capacity for change. After 
conceptualizing an ideal type, the essentialists try to reduce the whole 
Islamic world and history to their own construction. Islam is 
visualized as having one and the same impact wherever and whenever it 
meets whatever society. These theoretical foundations formed the main 
structure for maintenance of a bipolar system in international 
relations. Instead of the communist-capitalist paradigm, the new 
enemy of democratic, industrialized and capitalist West seems to be 
the underdeveloped, Human Rights challenging and, last but not 
least, Islamic East. Edward Said correctly questions the end of 
imperialism and underlines the continuation of Orientalism in the 
think tanks of the United States and namely in the theories of Bernard 
Lewis and Fouad Ajami.1 
The materialist, Marxist and the general evolutionist perspective 
are criticized for being implicitly orientalist or eurocentric. Sami 
Zubaida therefore wants to demonstrate the uselessness of class 
perspective for the right apprehension of the Islamic Revolution in 
                                                        
1 Said, E., “Preface to the Twenty-Fith Anniversary Edition”, in Orientalism, Vintage 
Books Edition, New York, 1994.  
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Iran. The bazaaris and the clergy can in no way be described as two 
homogeneous classes with the same economical background and 
interests neither in Marx’s nor in Weber’s definition of class. These 
social groups were not unified political actors on which the revolution 
could count. The configuration of their cohesion was a political event 
as such. It cannot be taken as pre-established. 
A third point of view is what in Anthropology is called the good 
savage theory. In today’s Islam-studies it is possible to recognize it in 
two different ways: The first is the definition of Islam as an absolutely 
new phenomenon which has no counterpart to compare with. In this 
line of thinking, Islam is a philosophy, religion, social organization 
and ethical system fallen from heaven completely isolated from its 
historical, social and political context. The second approach consists in 
the little objective admiration of Islam as something much better then 
our Western religious configurations. In my opinion the best way of 
analyzing Islam is Weber’s comprehensive sociology. As a matter of 
fact, without mentioning the German sociologist, Hamid Enayat2, 
Charles Kurzman3 and others adopt this all-comprehensive mode of 
research which has the virtue of including the Muslim point of view as 
well. In this paper, dedicated to Islam and Democracy, we will give 
voice to the early Islamic modernist, Ali Abderraziq4 and his view of 
Islam and government.  
 
 
2. BRIEF APPREHENSION OF THE HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND 
OF ABDERRAZIQ’S REFLECTIONS 
 
Modern Islamic political thought experienced a violent impact, which 
tore it immediately down from heaven to earth, when in 1924 the 
ottoman Caliphate was abolished by the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey. During the 19th century, according to Charles Kurzman’s 
                                                        
2 Enayat, H., Modern Islamic Political Thought, The Macmillian Press LTD, London & 
Basingstoke, 1982. 
3 Kurzman, Ch. (ed.), Liberal Islam, Oxford University Press, New York & Oxford, 
1998. 
4 I am writing his name following Filali-Ansary’s french translation. Other 
transcriptions are: Ali Abd ar-Raziq or Ali Abd al-Raziq (as in Kurzman’s collection 
and Enayat’s commentary I have already cited). 
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research and denomination, three schools of Islamic intellectualism 
developed. In the first place the one of Customary Islam, related to 
popular rites, mysticism and practices, in the second place Revivalist 
Islam, best known now-a-days as Islamism or Fundamentalism, and in 
the last place, Liberal Islam. The disappearance of the main symbolical 
religious-political institution of their religion, was approved as a great 
shock among Islamic scholars. Questions arose about the necessity 
and correctness in religious terms of the Caliphate. One position 
claimed for abolition, another, following Rashid Rida’s theories5, 
began to believe in the advantages of the construction of an Islamic 
State. The theology Professor of the Egyptian University of Al-Azhar 
and judge of the religious Court, Ali Abderraziq (1888-1966), inscribed 
himself among the first party of scholars with his reflection on the 
Caliphate, its nature, status, social function and history, published in 
1925, under the title “Al-islam wa uçul al-hukm: bahth fi al-khilafa wa al-
hukuma fi al-ilsam” (“Islam and the Fundamentals of Government”). 
Abdou Filali-Ansary6 who translated “Islam and the Fundamentals of 
Government” into French states that Abderraziq is the first Muslim 
scholar to claim an inherent laicism of Islam. His thesis are based on 
Muslim holy texts, the Koran and Hadith, and the medieval Islamic 
Philosophers, such as Ibn Khaldun about who’s work Abderraziq had 
written a thesis at the end of his studies in Political Sciences and 
Economics in the UK. His family had been involved in politics since 
his father (Hassan Pacha Abderraziq) had participated in the 
foundation of the “Umma”-Party in 19077. They were also in direct 
contact with the revivalist thinker Muhammad ‘Abduh. His brother, 
Mostafa, was trained at the traditionalist Al-Azhar University before 
completing his studies in France. Mostafa later combined his work as 
minister of religious issues, during several intervals between 1938 y 
1946, with his activities as a lecturer in modern philosophy at the Al-
Azhar University and ended up being Dean of the same academic 
institution. Ali received his intellectual instruction, still in his home-
country, not only at Al-Azhar but also at the new National University, 
inaugurated in 1908. His reflections on the Caliphate met an immense 
                                                        
5 Rida, R., The Caliphate of the Supreme Imamate, (Al-khilafah aw’al-imamat ‘al-uzma), 
El Cairo, 1922-23. 
6 Filali-Ansary, A.,  L'Islam est-il hostile á la laïcité?, Actes Sud, France, 2002. 
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disapproval among traditionalists, the Egyptian monarchs (who 
aspired to the succession of the drained Turkish Caliphate) and 
liberals of the “Wafd”-Party. Ali Abderraziq had to defend himself 
before the University Counsel which cancelled his title as ‘alim 
(lecturer in theology and Islamic Law). After being rehabilitated in 
1947, Ali participated in government until the Revolution.  
 
 
3. ISLAM AND THE FUNDAMENTALS OF POWER 
 
Abderraziq’s essay is divided in a symmetrical mode in three books, 
according to Spinoza’s and Wittgenstein’s logic. The first part treats 
the “Caliphate and Islam”, the second is dedicated to “Islam and 
Government” and the last is about the “Caliphate and Government in 
History”.  
 
In the first book, after having made some philological statements 
on the terms of “Caliph” and “Caliphate”, Abderraziq exposes the two 
main theories on the origin of authority of the Caliphate: the first 
wants power to derive directly from God. The Caliph is therefore 
God’s representative on earth.8 For certain Muslims the Caliph became 
a kind of divine incarnation or even a divinity on earth. The second 
theory about the source of  power follows the hypothesis of a 
delegation of responsibilities coming from the people, from the umma 
to the Caliph.9 Abderraziq states that the “memorial on the Caliphate 
and Power” published by the Grand National Assembly of Ankara 
defends exactly this point of view. He goes on to explain that the need 
for justification of the origins of power has not been exclusively 
Islamic but has its exact parallels in Western thinking and the two 
lines of argument are to be found in the reflections of Hobbes and 
Locke. 
 
After having stressed the two reasons of legitimization of  power 
in general, Abderraziq states that there are also two arguments which 
justify the institution of the Caliphate as the Islamic institution par 
                                                        
8 Abderraziq cites Ibn Khaldun, Al-Baydawi, Al-Farazdaq, Tarihi, Al-Katibi y Abd 
al-Hakim al-Sialakuti as representatives of this hypothesis.  
9 The author quotes Al-Hoteï’a, Al-Kasani as followers of this school. 
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excellence: the first defines the Caliphate as a political organization 
directly required by the religious dogma, and the second requires the 
Caliphate to be the only possible political organization able to protect 
the correct Muslim religious life style.  
 
Abderraziq replies the followers of the model of the Caliphate as 
a religious institution that there is absolutely no evidence supporting 
their vindication neither in the Koran nor in the Prophet’s tradition. To 
make his explanation more evident, the Islamic scholar uses a 
comparative method of theological exegesis on the purpose to gain 
more objectivity. Therefore, he argues that Jesus Christ evoked Cesar’s 
government and commanded to give Cesar what belongs to Cesar. 
Nevertheless [this statement] does not lead to the recognition by Jesus Christ 
to Cesar’s government of a base in the Law inspired by God. This does not 
imply that the recognition of this government forms part of the Christian 
belief. […] The Prophet’s Hadith where you can see the allusions to the terms 
of Caliphate, Imamate and allegiance do not mean anything more than Christ 
wanted to say when he evoked certain dispositions of the religious Law [how 
to respond] to government.10 Abderraziq continues his exposition by 
arguing that by proposing rules for their relationship with pagan 
peoples, the Prophet did not regularise paganism. Neither does the 
claim for submission under specific conjectural circumstances to a 
tyrant rise tyranny as a religiously legitimized political organization. 
The same argument is valid for the Prophet’s rules of generosity with 
the poor, treatment of slaves, handling of divorce, commerce and loan: 
the single existence of such rules does not transform mendacity, 
slavery, divorce, commerce and loan in religious phenomena.  
 
Ibn Khaldun argued that the Caliphate as a true religious 
institution had disappeared after Ali’s death and that henceforth 
                                                        
10 Jésus-Christ a évoqué le gouvernement de César, et a ordonné de  rendre á César ce 
qui est de César. Il n’en découle pas pour autant que Jésus reconnaissait au 
gouvernement de César un fondement dans la loi inspirée de Dieu. Il n’en découle pas 
que la reconnaissance de ce gouvernement fait partie des croyances chrétiennes. […] Les 
hadith du Prophète où l’on voit des allusions aux notions du califat, d’imamat, 
d’allégeance, ne signifient rien de plus que ce que le Christ a voulu dire lorsqu’il a 
évoqué certaines dispositions de la loi religieuse vis-à-vis du gouvernement de César. 
(Abderraziq, A. (1925), L’islam et les fondements du pouvoir, Filali-Ansary, A. (trad.), 
Éditions la Découverte, Paris, 1994, pag. 69-70). 
 
 
 
 
Astrolabio. Revista internacional de filosofía  
Año 2006. Núm. 3. ISSN 1699-7549 
 
 22 
 
 
monarchy was a government based upon and executed by force. 
Abderraziq concludes, after recalling Khaldun’s point of view, that 
Islam is a practical religion which does not allow tyranny: […] islam is 
a religion which was not satisfied with teaching the ideal of fraternity and 
equality to its adepts, with inculcating them the doctrine for which men are 
equal “as the teeth of the comb”, that their slaves are at the same time their 
brothers in religion, that believers are allied the ones with the others… No! 
Islam did not cling to a theoretical and isolated education of its doctrine. On 
the contrary, it [Islam] trained its believers to make use of them [Islamic 
principals] in their everyday life, it educated and exercised them to strictly 
observe them in their activities. It proposed to them rights based on fraternity 
and equality, it proved them [these rights] within real circumstances and 
demonstrated the consequences of their validity. They have acquired a lively 
perception of fraternity and an intensely lived feeling of equality.11 This is 
the reason why Abderraziq concludes that the Caliphate was an 
institution alien to the Islamic religion and made up by power even 
against Islamic ethic. It is therefore impossible to extract any 
justification for the Caliphate from Islamic doctrine.  
 
The second argument that claims the necessity of the Caliphate 
insists on it being absolutely vital for the guarantee of a correct 
Muslim lifestyle. Abderraziq pronounces himself as a strict follower of 
the Contractualists’ theory of the indispensability of a government for 
whatever society. If the theologians, claming the importance of the 
Caliphate, were thinking of the necessity of government for the 
administration and leadership of a society in an abstract way, 
Abderraziq would undoubtedly agree. In this case, “Caliphate” would 
be a synonym of “government” and could adopt whatever form 
                                                        
11 […] l’islam est une religion que ne s’est pas contentée d’enseigner à ses adeptes l’idéal 
de la fraternité et de l’égalité, de leur inculquer la doctrine selon laquelle les hommes 
sont égaux “comme les dents du peigne”, que leurs esclaves sont en même temps leurs 
frères en religion, que les croyants sont alliés les uns aux autres… Non! L’islam ne s’est 
pas tenu à un enseignement théorique et détaché de ces principes. Au contraire, il a 
entraîné les fidèles à les appliquer dans leur vie de tous les jours, les a éduqués et exercés 
à les observer strictement dans leurs activités. Il a posé pour eux des lois fondées sur la 
fraternité et l’égalité, les a éprouvés dans des circonstances réelles et leur a fait voir les 
conséquences de leur mise en oeuvre. Ils en ont tiré une perception vive de la fraternité 
et un sentiment intensément vécu de l’égalité. (Abderraziq, A. (1925), L’islam et les 
fondements du pouvoir, Filali-Ansary, A. (trad.), Éditions la Découverte, Paris, 1994, pp. 
76-77). 
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reaching from democracy to dictatorship. Nevertheless, scholars 
usually refer to “Caliphate” as the historical political institution 
dominant in the Arabic World and, following this argument, 
Abderraziq refuses to accept that this mode of political organization is 
indispensable for the survival of the Muslim community. As a matter 
of fact, it is an essentialist error to claim that the Caliphate has been 
one and the same since the death of Mohammed in 632. The most 
contemporary version of the Caliphate had just been abolished when 
Abderraziq was bringing his reflections to paper and this did not 
provoke a shift in Muslim belief. It is interesting to put forward that 
Abderraziq thought it to be possible, on the one hand, to unify the 
whole of humanity under the same religion but, on the other hand, he 
found it completely utopian to pretend a universal government of all 
Nations: it is conceivable that humanity can be unified within the same 
religion and that it constitutes in this way a single religious community. 
Although pretending to submit the whole earth to one single government, to 
unite it within one and the same political entity, this seems nearly strange to 
human nature and can not be related with divine prevision.12 Men are 
different and it is natural that they govern their activities in harmony 
with their dissimilarities. God, concludes Abderraziq, decided to leave 
to the humans the responsibility to govern themselves. Abderraziq’s 
perception of human inequality might sound contradictory at this 
point to his statement of equality as a basic element of the Islamic 
dogma. This confusion happens because of the already cited 
undistinguished use of the term Islam to describe a socio-historical 
reality or an ethical-religious system of metaphysical belief. 
Abderraziq does not fail to notice this point of misunderstanding. We 
therefore have to clarify that for Abderraziq, Islam as a religious 
dogma inspires clearly a democratic ethic: men are equal before God. 
Nevertheless, these equal souls are born as unequal humans within 
very different cultural and historical circumstances. This is the reason 
why they had and are still having diverse forms of government. 
                                                        
12 Il est concevable que l’humanité puisse être unifiée au sein d’une même religion et qu’elle 
constitue ainsi une seule communauté religieuse. Quant à vouloir soumettre toute la terre à 
un seul gouvernement, à la rassembler en une seule et même entité politique, cela semble 
presque étranger à la nature humaine et ne peut être lié à la volonté divine. (Abderraziq, A. 
(1925), L’islam et les fondements du pouvoir, Filali-Ansary, A. (trad.), Éditions la 
Découverte, Paris, 1994, pag. 128). 
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Nonetheless, Islam as a religious composition does preferably call for 
a democratic system. 
 
Abderraziq starts his second book in a very unorthodox way of 
thinking. His analysis turns around the interrogation whether the 
Prophet was only a Prophet or at the same time a King. He states that 
this mode of asking cannot be considered heretic because it does not 
question the religious mission of the Prophet as such. Abderraziq 
finds it completely obvious that there exists an urgent necessity to 
throw more light on the structure of Mohammed’s original 
community as most of Islamic scholars interpret even this community 
as the ideal model for all Muslim societies. This is the reason why it is 
important to extract the concrete functions of Mohammed within his 
community. Abderraziq starts defining two different types of 
prophets: on the one hand, there is God’s messenger who has no other 
mission than to transmit the divine message to his people. As a clear 
representative of this form of pure prophecy Abderraziq alleges Jesus. 
On the other hand, there were prophets who were in charge, besides 
their task as God’s delegates, of other administrative occupations, as 
for example Joseph at the Pharao’s Court. Abderraziq states that most 
Muslims, with or without academic training, are convinced of 
Mohammed as belonging to the second type. Nevertheless, there is 
scarce material to describe in a scientifically satisfactory manner 
Mohammed’s community. For Abderraziq there are two explanations 
of this documentary hole. The first of them wants all items of proof to 
be lost. The second argues that Mohammed’s community has been so 
pure and innocent and therefore so simple that sophisticated 
institutions and their descriptions never existed. Abderraziq agrees 
that the first Muslim community did not develop any characteristic 
such as those which political scientists do observe in modern state 
structures. One of the most important occupations of the Medinan 
community was holy war. Was holy war a religious activity? 
Abderraziq denies this possibility because, according to the Koran and 
Hadith, God did not order a forced conversion of pagans. It cannot be 
denied hence that Mohammed, by leading the holy war, was handling 
a not entirely religious task. Abderraziq puts forward that God’s 
messenger necessarily needs a  special social level, an integer moral, 
an extraordinary beauty, an impressive physical constitution, an 
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exemplary sensibility and a huge capacity for uniting people and 
convince them to follow the divine commandments. The charismatic 
faculties of a Prophet have to go much further than those of a pure 
institutional political leader or a family father. By using the examples 
of the political leader and the family father Abderraziq states 
implicitly that the reason which legitimates the Prophet’s authority 
must be even stronger than institutional recognition or clan ties. The 
Prophet can take up secular responsibilities without loosing his 
additional extraordinary capabilities. God’s messenger shares a 
profound connection with the hearts and the most intimate part of the 
human soul. He reaches the source of love and hate and reads men’s 
thoughts. Responsibility over all issues of this world and the next lies 
in this exemplary person’s hands. Mohammed’s message is perceived 
as different from the one of his predecessors because it is directed to 
the entire humanity and it is conceived as the seal of prophecy, the last 
and definite revelation. In Muslim faith, God’s message was 
transmitted completely by Mohammed as a perfect union of belief and 
rites to the one and only God. Mohammed was, therefore, the prophet 
with the largest faculties of all of God’s messengers. Abderraziq insists 
again in the importance of the difference between the two types of 
power: the power which a prophet exercises on his people is of a spiritual 
nature and derives from faith that it acquires from the hearts. Submission to 
this power is perfectly honest and induces the submission of the body. The 
power of the prince, [on the other hand], is of a material nature: it reaches the 
submission of the body without having established any contact with the 
hearts. The first focuses on guiding men on the right way and on initiating 
them to the Truth, the second concentrates on the administration of the vital 
services of the community and on the occupation of land. One seeks to 
establish religion, the other to serve the interests of the world. One is directed 
to God, the other to men. One is a spiritual and religious guide, the other is a 
pure secular labour. How much are they distant the one from the other! What 
distance between politics and religion.13 Abderraziq finally concludes that 
                                                        
13 Le pouvoir qu’un prophète exerce sur son peuple est de nature spirituelle et naît de la foi 
qu’il acquiert dans les coeurs. La soumission à ce pouvoir est parfaitement sincère et entraîne 
la soumission des corps. Le pouvoir du prince, lui, est de nature matérielle; il aboutit à la 
soumission du corps sans qu’aucun contact soit établi avec les coeurs. Le premier vise à 
diriger les hommes dans la voie juste et à les initier au Vrai, le second porte sur la gestion des 
services vitaux de la communauté et sur l’occupation des terres. L’un cherche à établir la 
religion, l’autre à servir les intérêts de ce monde. L’un est dirigé vers Dieu, l’autre vers les 
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Mohammed’s message was purely religious and cannot be mixed up 
with his activities as a secular leader. His civil and political work was 
not transmitted to him directly from God. He organised his 
community in a more or less democratic form within the society of his 
time and asked his followers on advice. If his political leadership had 
been divinely inspired he would not have had to consult with 
anybody.  
 
Abderraziq initiates his third and last book of the essay by 
claiming that Islam is not an Arabian but a universal religion. God had 
chosen an Arabian Messenger and it is therefore reasonable that the 
transmission of the religious dogma to him was held in Arabic and 
reached the Arabian people in the first place. Nevertheless, the 
Muslim message has clear universal characteristics and cannot be 
restricted to the Arab World. The Arabian peoples, even after having 
converted to Islam, continued to be separated into different political 
unities. After the short union during Mohammed’s life the community 
fought about the succession of the Prophet in his tasks as a political 
and religious administrator. The disagreement between the followers 
of Mohammed at the moment of the election of a new leader did not 
run parallel with the refusal of the religion by the adversaries of Abu 
Bakr. It is true that the first occupation of the Caliph Abu Bakr 
consisted in fighting against apostasy. Nevertheless, Abderraziq 
claims that the later wars were not all struggles against apostasy 
anymore, but that this denomination was maintained due to pure 
propagandistic reasons. It is evident therefore that religion survived 
the whole political division. After the Prophet’s death, what remained 
was a religious community divided in a multiplicity of different 
political organizations. With the instauration of the Caliphate, Arabian 
invented a real Arabian state which had nothing o do with religious 
belief as such. The Arabian state surely built on a religious base with 
the goal to defend God’s message that had been transmitted by 
Mohammed. Nobody denies the immense influences this state had on 
the predication and extension of the new religion. It nevertheless 
                                                                                                                                                
hommes. L’un est direction spirituelle et religieuse, l’autre oeuvre purement séculière. 
Combien sont-ils éloignés l’un de l’autre! Que de distance entre politique et religion! 
(Abderraziq, A. (1925), L’islam et les fondements du pouvoir, Filali-Ansary, A. (trad.), 
Éditions la Découverte, Paris, 1994, pag. 119). 
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remained an Arabian state useful to the purpose of the extension and 
maintenance of the Arabian dominance. As a matter of fact, neither 
Abu Bakr nor any of the other members of the elite claimed that the post of the 
leader of Muslims constituted a religious dignity and never considered 
disobedience as a rejection of religion. 14  
Abderraziq concludes that the title “Caliph” (“successor and 
vicar of the Prophet”) and the historical circumstances which had 
brand-marked its use, caused the confusion of Muslims who ended up 
by identifying the Caliphate as a religious institution. The institution 
that Muslims have agreed on calling “Caliphate” is in fact completely strange 
to their religion, in the same way as the honours, the strength, the attractions 
and intimidations by which it is surrounded.15 This is the reason why 
there is no religious concept that unchangeably hinders Muslims of 
competing with the other nations in all social and political sciences. Nothing 
forbids them to destroy a system out of use which has thrown them back and 
slept them under its fist. Nothing stays in their way to construct their state 
and their system of government on the foundation of the latest creations of 
human mind and on the base of systems who’s stability has been proven, 
those which the experience of the nations have named as among the best.16  
4. CONCLUSION 
 
We will start the conclusion with Hamid Enayat’s critique of modern 
Islamic political thought. He firstly pronounces himself to be uneasy 
about the lack of a universally accepted definition of democracy and 
claims that such is impossible to be found in modern Islamic essays on 
                                                        
14 Ni Abou Bakr, ni aucun autre membre de l’élite n’a prétendu que la fonction de chef des 
musulmans constituait une dignité religieuse, et n’a jamais considéré la désobéissance comme 
un rejet de la religion. (Abderraziq, A. (1925), L’islam et les fondements du pouvoir, Filali-
Ansary, A. (trad.), Éditions la Découverte, Paris, 1994, pag. 146). 
15 En vérité, cette institution que les musulmans ont convenu d’appeler califat est 
entièrement étrangère à leur religion, tout comme les honneurs, la puissance, les attraits et 
l’intimidation dont elle a été entourée. (Abderraziq, A. (1925), L’islam et les fondements du 
pouvoir, Filali-Ansary, A. (trad.), Éditions la Découverte, Paris, 1994, pag. 155). 
16 Aucun principe religieux n’interdit aux musulmans de concurrencer les autres nations 
dans toutes les sciences sociales et politiques. Rien ne leur interdit de détruire ce système 
désuet qui les a avilis et les a endormis sous sa poigne. Rien ne les empêche d’édifier leur État 
et leur système de gouvernement sur la base des dernières créations de la raison humaine et 
sur la base des systèmes dont la solidité a été prouvée, ceux que l’expérience des nations a 
désignés comme étant parmi les meilleurs. (Abderraziq, A. (1925), L’islam et les 
fondements du pouvoir, Filali-Ansary, A. (trad.), Éditions la Découverte, Paris, 1994, 
pag. 156). 
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political subjects neither in general terms, nor in a specifically Western 
formulation. Secondly, he states that modern Islamic scholars fail to 
develop a theory of Islamic democracy and that they usually reduce 
their studies to a mere translation of democratic concepts to an Islamic 
language. And finally he observes that they are not able to adapt 
neither the ethical and legal precepts nor the attitudes and institutions 
of traditional society to democracy. Enayat concludes that it is because 
of this neglect that the hopes of evolving a coherent theory of democracy 
appropriate to an Islamic context have remained largely unfulfilled. Perhaps 
the neglect is deliberate or unavoidable, because […] all efforts to synthesise 
Islam and democracy are bound to founder on the bedrock of that body of 
eternal and unchangeable doctrines which form the quintessence of every 
religion.17  
It is certainly true that there is no large definition of democracy 
in Abderraziq’s “Islam and the Fundamentals of Power”. Nonetheless, 
he clearly shows that democracy as a specific form of government (in 
contrast with the Caliphate) can not only be conciliated with Islam but 
is the one most according to its dogma. This is certainly a starting 
point for further research. Regrettably, not only at the time of 
Abderraziq’s trial before the University Counsel of Al-Azhar, but until 
the present day, political, economical and social historical facts are 
true obstacles even to theoretical conceptualization of democracy in 
Islamic states. Abderraziq’s trial recalls to us the one of Galileo Galilei 
but unfortunately without the latter crying out: “eppur si muove”. We 
might therefore conclude with Enayat that no religious dogma, 
claiming universal and eternal truth, can be conciliated with 
democracy but this not the subject of this paper. Therefore, we can at 
least affirm that Islam is not in greater proportion contradictory to 
democratic principles than Christianity. Abderraziq also shows that 
Islam can be perfectly combined with a laic state and this is probably 
the best institutional guarantee, developed to the present day, of 
tolerance and of individual and collective rights.  
 
                                                        
17 Enayat, H., Modern Islamic Political Thought, The Macmillian Press LTD, London & 
Basingstoke, 1982, pag. 135. 
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